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Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why?
Lawrence W. Waggoner*
By unwittingly granting a tax exemption for perpetual trusts,
Congress undermined state perpetuity law and promoted private trusts
that can last and remain tax exempt for many centuries and maybe
forever. As a direct result of Congress’s action, and then of lobbying by
financial institutions and other interest groups to convince state
legislatures to remove the obstacle of perpetuity law, the very wealthy can
now create tax-exempt private trusts for generations upon generations of
their descendants. And they are massively taking advantage of the
opportunity.
Congress as an institution has known of its blunder for years, but has
failed to remedy its mistake. On February 26, 2014, the House Ways and
Means Committee unveiled its long-awaited proposal for comprehensive
tax reform, but the proposal does not address the tax exemption for
perpetual trusts. The prospect for enactment of comprehensive tax reform
in this Congress—the 113th—appears bleak in any event.
The author asks why Congress has not acted to correct its mistake
and why it seems so uninterested in doing so. There is no federal interest
in promoting perpetually tax-exempt trusts and, in fact, the federal
interest cuts the other way. Tax revenues are lost by Congress’s action
and subsequent inaction. A plausible explanation for Congress’s
persistent indifference to the problem is that the revenue gain by
correcting the oversight would be a long way off. Congress is not known
for giving a high priority to problems of that sort. The longer Congress
procrastinates, however, the amount of wealth that is safely sheltered in
perpetually tax-exempt trusts—already estimated to be in the billions of
dollars—continues to grow. 
The Treasury Department has a proposal before Congress for
remedying the situation, but the Treasury’s proposal, reiterated in the
president’s proposed budget for 2015 issued on March 4, 2014, but
ignored by the Ways and Means Committee’s comprehensive tax-reform
proposal, is not nearly as effective as it could and should be. The author
proposes a remedy that would be entirely effective and would be
consistent with the original purpose of the tax law. 
Regrettably, the prospect that Congress will ever address the
problem, much less address it effectively, grows dimmer with each passing
year.
*  Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. The author is
the Reporter for the recently completed Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers (vol.1, 1999; vol. 2, 2003; vol. 3, 2011). Although parts of this article
draw on the Restatement, the views expressed are my own and not made on behalf of the
American Law Institute. For commenting on earlier drafts, I thank Gregory Alexander,
Thomas Gallanis, John Langbein, and Raymond Young.
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INTRODUCTION
Years ago, in 1986 to be exact, Congress unwittingly granted a tax
exemption for perpetual trusts.1 In so doing, Congress undermined
state perpetuity law and promoted private trusts that can last and
remain tax exempt for many centuries and maybe forever.2 Although
Congress as an institution has known of its blunder for years, it has
had several opportunities to remedy its mistake but has not done so.3
1  See infra Part III.
2  See id.
3  It appears that the congressional tax-writing authorities were first officially notified
of the problem in a 2005 report of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. See STAFF
2
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Why? Not only is there is no federal interest in promoting perpetually
tax-exempt trusts, the federal interest cuts the other way. Tax
revenues will be lost by Congress’s action and subsequent inaction.
A plausible explanation for Congress’s persistent indifference to the
problem is that no tax revenues are lost now.4 The loss will occur
when these trusts cross the boundary previously set by state perpetuity
law. Unfortunately, Congress seldom gives a high priority to
remedying far-distant problems. Although the congressional tax-
writing committees are currently working on comprehensive tax
reform, the committees have shown no interest in remedying the
problem at hand.5 The longer Congress procrastinates, however, it is
the case that it is permitting an ever-growing accumulation of
wealth—already estimated to be in the billions of dollars6—to be
safely sheltered in perpetually tax-exempt trusts. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL STATE-LAW MEANS OF CURTAILING
EXCESSIVE DEAD-HAND CONTROL—THE COMMON-LAW RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES—WAS DEEPLY FLAWED AND IN NEED OF
REFORM
By almost any measure, perpetual trusts (often called “dynasty
trusts” by those promoting them7) constitute excessive dead-hand
control.8 For centuries, Anglo-American law curtailed excessive
REPORT, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 393 (JCS-02-05, Jan. 27, 2005). For details, see infra note 99.
See also William J. Turnier & Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Malthusian Analysis of the So-Called
Dynasty Trust, 28 VA. TAX REV. 779, 784 n.10 (2009).
After the JCT staff issued its 2005 report, Congress passed the following acts that
amended the Internal Revenue Code without remedying its mistake regarding perpetually
tax-exempt trusts: American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat.
2313 (2013); Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010); American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2008); Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-432, 120 Stat. 292 (2006); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109–222, 120 Stat. 345 (2005).
4  For a more cynical yet plausible explanation, see infra note 114.
5  See infra Part VI.B.
6  See infra notes 29, 39-40.
7  See Turnier & Harrison, supra note 3, at 811 (“The name chosen to promote such
trusts [referring to the term “dynasty trusts”] is primarily the product of a clever marketing
campaign and not descriptive of the results that such trusts are likely to produce in the
ordinary course of events.”)
8  See infra Part IV.
3
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dead-hand control through the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
(the common-law Rule). Judicial concern about excessive dead-hand
control appeared as early as the seventeenth century when Lord
Nottingham, in the Duke of Norfolk’s Case,9 upheld the trust at issue
but suggested that there was a limit “when any inconvenience appears
. . . .”10 The courts thereafter developed the common-law Rule case
by case over a long period of time. As developed by the courts, and
as crystallized in the late nineteenth century by Harvard Law School
Professor John Chipman Gray, the common-law Rule came to be
stated as follows: “No [contingent future] interest [in real or
personal property] is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.”11 
As a mechanism for curtailing excessive dead-hand control, the
common-law Rule was poorly designed. It suffered from many flaws.
First, it invalidated a contingent future interest on the basis of what
might happen in the future, not on the basis of what actually happened
in the future. If, when created, a contingent future interest might not
vest or fail to vest within the allowable perpetuity period, the future
interest was invalid ab initio. Second, the allowable common-law
Rule perpetuity period was measured by lives in being at the creation
of the interest plus twenty-one years (plus, if necessary, a period of
gestation). Requiring the measuring lives to be in being at the creation
of the interest often divided members of the same generation into
measuring and non-measuring lives. Third, the common-law Rule
focused only on the validity of a contingent future interest, not on the
time when a trust or other donative disposition of property
terminated. 
9  3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
10  The background, details, and historical significance of the case are discussed in
D.E.C. YALE, INTRODUCTION, 1 LORD NOTTINGHAM’S CHANCERY CASES, at lxxiii–xci (1957)
(Selden Soc. Vol. 73). Other historical literature includes A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEADING CASES
IN THE COMMON LAW 76-79 (1995); A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY:
ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 143-162 (1987) [hereinafter SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY]; J.H.
BAKER & S.F.C. MILSON, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, at
189-94 (J. Baker ed., 2d ed. 2010); George L. Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead
Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19
(1977).
11  JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (2d ed. 1906). A
similar formulation was set forth in the first edition of the book published in 1886:“No
interest subject to a condition precedent is good, unless the condition must be fulfilled, if at
all, within twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” JOHN
CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (1886).
4
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In the middle of the twentieth century, Harvard Law School
Professor W. Barton Leach spotted and attempted to fix the first flaw.
He assailed the what-might-happen approach for setting what he
called “traps for the unwary.”12 Leach focused on three cases, which
he dubbed the “fertile octogenarian,” the “unborn widow,” and the
“administrative contingency.” The common thread in these cases was
that the Rule invalidated future interests on the basis of exceedingly
remote possibilities—the possibility that an elderly man or woman
would have a child, the possibility that a man would marry a woman
who was not born when the trust was created, and the possibility that
a decedent’s estate would not be settled within twenty-one years.
Leach’s proposed solution was to replace the what-might-happen
approach with a what-does-happen approach. Under the what-does-
happen approach, which came to be called wait-and-see, a future
interest would only be invalidated if it did not vest, if at all, not later
than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest. Under the what-does-happen approach, the affected future
interests in these three cases would almost certainly turn out to be
valid.  
Leach had little success in reforming perpetuity law. One of the
obstacles was the lack of a consensus about whom to use as
measuring lives.13 The common-law Rule did not provide measuring
lives for wait-and-see. Under the common-law Rule, a future interest
was either valid or invalid. Validity depended on identifying a
measuring life that made the interest valid. Hence, the measuring life
was actually a validating life, because invalidity arose when no
validating life could be identified. Since the purpose of wait-and-see
was to save interests that would have been invalid, the common law
provided no measuring lives for wait-and-see.  
But wait-and-see perpetuity reform did come. In 1978, A. James
Casner, Leach’s colleague at Harvard and the reporter for the Second
Restatement of Property,14 brought a wait-and-see proposal before the
floor of the American Law Institute. Following a momentous debate
involving spirited exchanges between Professor Casner and Professor
12  See W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule’s Reign of
Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952); W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter
of the Innocents, 68 LAW Q. REV. 35 (1952).
13  See Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The “Wait and See”
Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179 (1953).
14  Officially, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS (1983).
5
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Richard R. Powell, who was the reporter for the First Restatement of
Property, the Institute in 1979 adopted wait-and-see. The Second
Restatement took the form of a two-tier Rule: It provided that a
contingent future interest that would be valid under the common-law
Rule remains valid at its outset, but a contingent future interest that
would be invalid under the common-law Rule is only invalid if it
does not actually vest or fail to vest within twenty-one years after the
death of the last living measuring life.15 The Restatement Second
provided a specific list of measuring lives to be used for measuring
the allowable period. The list included the transferor and the
beneficiaries of the disposition who were alive at the creation of the
contingent future interest. The Restatement Second’s list was
controversial16 and never adopted judicially or legislatively.17 
15  See id. §§ 1.1 to 1.6. For a transcript of the Casner-Powell debate, see 56 ALI PROC.
453-66 (1979).
16  See Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1648
(1985). Professor Dukeminier’s “causal-relationship” proposal for identifying wait-and-see
measuring lives was also controversial. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Perpetuities: A
Perspective on Wait-and-See, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1985). “Causal relationship” wait-
and-see statutes were enacted in only a few states (e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 381.216 (1979)),
and all of them have been repealed (e.g., 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 21, § 14, codified at KY. REV.
STAT. § 381.216 (2010)).
17  The closest legislative enactment occurred in Iowa. See IOWA CODE § 558.68, which
uses the following list of measuring lives for wait-and-see: 
(1) The creator of the nonvested interest, if the period of the rule begins to
run in the creator's lifetime.
(2) Those persons alive when the period begins to run, if reasonable in
number, who have been selected by the creator of the interest to measure the
validity of the nonvested interest or, if none, those persons, if reasonable in
number, who have a beneficial interest whether vested or nonvested in the
property in which the nonvested interest exists, the grandparents of all such
beneficiaries and the issue of such grandparents alive when the period of the rule
begins to run, and those persons who are the potential appointees of a special
power of appointment exercisable over the property in which the nonvested
interests exist who are the grandparents or issue of the grandparents of the donee
of the power and alive when the period of the rule begins to run.
(3) Those other persons alive when the period of the rule begins to run, if
reasonable in number, who are specifically mentioned in describing the
beneficiaries of the property in which the nonvested interest exists.
(4) The donee of a general or special power of appointment if the donee is
alive when the period of the rule begins to run and if the exercise of that power
could affect the nonvested interest.
6
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II. THE WAIT-AND-SEE REFORM GAINS TRACTION VIA THE
UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (USRAP)
Although the Restatement Second was not successful in the courts
or state legislatures, it did influence perpetuity law. As a direct result
of the adoption of wait-and-see by the American Law Institute, the
Uniform Law Commission appointed a committee to draft a uniform
law on perpetuities. The result was the promulgation of the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) in 1986.18 USRAP
continued the two-tier approach, by providing that a contingent future
interest that would be valid under the common-law Rule remains
valid at the outset, but a contingent future interest that would be
invalid under the common-law Rule is only invalid if it does not
actually vest or fail to vest within the permissible vesting period.19 In
order to avoid disagreements about whom to use as wait-and-see
measuring lives, USRAP abandoned the use of actual measuring lives
as a measure of the permissible vesting period and instead adopted
ninety years as a conservative approximation of the life-in-being-plus-
twenty-one-years period.20 USRAP made wait-and-see perpetuity
reform achievable.
USRAP was incorporated into the Uniform Probate Code21 and
came to be enacted in over half of the states.22 It was on its way to
even wider enactment when Congress intervened, with the effect of
stalling and then reversing its progress. 
A very important point is that throughout the perpetuity-reform
18  The author is the reporter for the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.
19  See UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a) (1986).
20  See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: The
Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157 (1988). Increased
longevity occurring since 1986 has made the 90-years period even more conservative. In
2009, the United Kingdom adopted a 125-year period. See U.K. Perpetuities and
Accumulations Act 2009 § 5. The U.K. Act, which applies to England and Wales, can be
found at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2009/pdf/ukpga_20090018_en.pdf.
21  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901 to -906.
22  ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-3-101 TO -109; CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200 to 21225; GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 44-6-200 to -206; IND. CODE §§ 32-17-8-1 to -2; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-
3401 to -3408; MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 184A §§ 1 to 11; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 501A.01 to .07;
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-1002 to -1007; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2F-9 to -11; N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45-2-901 to -906; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 41-15 to -22 (non-trusts); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 47-02-27.1 to -27.5; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.950 to .975; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-6-10 to
-80; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-1-201 to -208; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1A-1 to -8. No state
today follows the common-law Rule in its pure form. Mississippi has not modified the
common-law Rule by statute, but appears to have adopted wait-and-see judicially. See Estate
of Anderson v. Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank, 541 So.2d 423 (Miss. 1989).
7
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debates, the central purpose of the Rule as a rule of public policy
whose purpose is to prohibit a trust settlor from transferring private
wealth in perpetuity was never questioned. The perpetuity-reform
movement was about making the Rule easier to understand and more
suited to its central purpose. 
III. CONGRESS UNWITTINGLY PROMOTES PERPETUAL TRUSTS
State-law perpetuity reform, including USRAP, was designed to
remedy the what-might-happen defect in the common-law Rule, not
to extend the permissible length of trusts or to remove any limit on
their length. And, before 1986, the wealthy had little incentive and
probably little desire to establish perpetual trusts, even though the law
of three states—Wisconsin, South Dakota, and Idaho—permitted
such trusts.23 Then, in 1986, Congress enacted the current incarnation
of the federal generation-skipping transfer tax (GST tax).24 The GST
tax imposes a flat tax at the highest federal estate tax rate (forty
percent as of 2013 and beyond) on generation-skipping transfers.25
The purpose of the GST tax is to make sure that property is taxed
every time it shifts from generation to generation or skips a
generation.26
23  See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining
the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2466-68 (2006); Mary Louise
Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2511 (2006), who noted that Congress “discouraged dynastic trusts with the GST
tax, while at the same time encouraging them through the GST tax exemption.” Fellows,
supra, at 2516. Fellows also argued that “the GST tax exemption put a ‘spark’ to the
dynasitc impulse already present.” Fellows, supra, at 2511.
24  I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663.
25  See id. §§ 2641, 2001.
26  There are three types of generation-skipping transfers subject to the GST tax (unless
exempted): taxable terminations, taxable distributions, and direct skips. See I.R.C. § 2611. 
In general, a taxable termination occurs when an interest in trust property terminates,
unless immediately after the termination, a non-skip person has an interest in the property
or at no time after the termination may a distribution be made from the trust to a skip person.
See I.R.C. § 2612(a). For example, in a trust to pay income to or for the benefit of the
settlor’s daughter D for life, then principal to D’s children (the settlor’s grandchildren), the
termination of D’s life interest would be a taxable termination. See Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-
1(f) Ex. (4). 
A taxable distribution occurs when income or principal is distributed from a trust to a
skip person. See § I.R.C. 2612(b). Thus, for example, in a trust to pay the income to or for
the benefit of the settlor’s son S for life, with a direction to pay half of the principal to S’s
child, GC, when GC reaches age 35, the distribution of half of the principal to GC on GC’s
35th birthday would be a taxable distribution. See Treas. Reg. § 26.2612-1(f) Ex. (10). 
A direct skip occurs when an interest in property is transferred to a skip person in a
manner that is subject to the federal gift tax or federal estate tax. See I.R.C. § 2612(c). A skip
8
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The GST exemption,27 not the GST tax itself, sparked the
perpetual-trust movement.28 As its name implies, the GST exemption
allows settlors to create trusts that are exempt from the GST tax. As
of 2014, the ceiling on the exemption is $5.34 million (twice that for
a married couple).29 Various estate-planning techniques can be used
to leverage the amount exempted beyond the exemption’s ceiling.30
One of the simplest techniques is to fund the trust with life insurance
policies or, better yet, second-to-die life insurance policies, both of
which when contributed to the trust have a much lower value than the
ultimate payoff. And, a GST-exempt trust retains its exemption no
matter how much the trust’s post-creation value appreciates above the
maximum exemption amount. 
When Congress granted the exemption, it failed to impose a
durational limit on exempt trusts. Congress relied on state perpetuity
laws to supply that limit. In hindsight, the reliance on state perpetuity
laws was badly misplaced.31 At the instigation of state banking groups
person is defined in I.R.C. § 2613 as (1) a natural person assigned to a generation that is two
or more generations below the generation assignment of the transferor or (2) a trust if all
interests in the trust are held by skip persons or if there is no person holding an interest in
the trust and at no time after the transfer may a distribution be made from the trust to a non-
skip person. Thus, for example, a gift to a grandchild would be direct skip. See Treas. Reg.
§ 26.2612-1(f) Ex. (1).
27  I.R.C. § 2631.
28  See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 23 passim. In a 1984 statement before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, Raymond H. Young, Chairman, Generation-
Skipping Transfer Tax Subcommittee, Boston Bar Association, predicted that the GST
exemption would result in a “substantial increase in the establishment of generation skipping
trusts.” Young, however, was referring to generation-skipping trusts “within the period of
the rule against perpetuities.” He did not then foresee that state banking groups and estate-
planning attorneys would lobby state legislatures to change perpetuity law to allow perpetual
GST-exempt trusts. See Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
On Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 335, 336-38 (1984).
29  The ceiling on the GST exemption is coordinated with the ceiling on the estate and
gift tax exemption and was set at $5 million in 2010. The increase to $5.34 million resulted
from an inflation adjustment that took effect at the beginning of 2012. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text; infra note 80 and accompanying text.
30  See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD 82-83 (2010); Iris J. Goodwin, How the Rich Stay Rich: Using a Family
Trust Company to Secure a Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 467, 490-97 (2010).
31  See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 164 (March 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY
2015.pdf (last visited March 5, 2014): “At the time of the enactment of the GST provisions,
the law of most (all but about three) states included the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities (RAP) or some statutory version of it. The RAP generally requires that every
trust terminate no later than 21 years after the death of a person who was alive (a life in
9
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and estate-planning attorneys,32 states began to pass legislation
allowing settlors to create perpetual trusts—trusts that can last for
several centuries33 or even forever.34 
Congress and state legislative bodies have therefore combined to
set the perpetual-trust movement in motion. Although Congress did
not intend to do so, whereas the state legislative bodies acted
deliberately, the primary responsibility still rests with Congress. By
creating, albeit inadvertently, a tax advantage for trusts that can
remain tax exempt for centuries, Congress is the legislative body that
facilitated the movement.35 Summing up, the ALI’s Property
Restatement Third concludes: “An unintended consequence of tax
law should not determine policy on so fundamental a matter as state
perpetuity law . . . .”36
But Congress has not acted to close the tax loophole,37 and the
perpetual-trust movement is in full bloom. With state perpetuity laws
out of the way, the wealthy created and continue to create perpetual
being) at the time of the creation of the trust. Many states now either have repealed or
limited the application of their RAP statutes, with the effect that trusts created subject to the
law of those jurisdictions may continue in perpetuity. (A trust may be sitused anywhere; a
grantor is not limited to the jurisdiction of the grantor’s domicile for this purpose.) As a
result, the transfer tax shield provided by the GST exemption effectively has been expanded
from trusts funded with $1 million (the exemption at the time of enactment of the GST tax)
and a maximum duration limited by the RAP, to trusts funded with $5.34 million and
continuing (and growing) in perpetuity.”
32  See Edward J. McCaffery, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform, 65 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 21, 26 (2012) (“Who benefits [from perpetual trusts]? .... [A] very large
class of trust companies and other financial intermediaries.”); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff,
supra note 23, at 2479 (“[L]awyers and bankers [in many states] began agitating for repeal
[of the Rule Against Perpetuities] after the 1986 tax reform, once they began to perceive a
loss of business to other states.”); Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the
Trust at the New Millennium, or, We Don’t Have to Think of England Anymore, 62 ALB. L.
REV. 543, 572 (1998) (“When the bankers want something, they get it.”); Turnier &
Harrison, supra note 7. 
33  One-thousand years in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming; 500 years in Arizona; 365
years in Nevada; 360 years in Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee.
34  Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
35  See Ira Mark Bloom, How Federal Transfer Taxes Affect the Development of
Property Law, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 661, 673 (2000) (“The very recent perpetuities repeal
movement is the best example of how federal transfer tax laws affect the development of
property law in the worst of ways.”). See also Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail is Killing
The Rule Against Perpetuities, TAX NOTES 569 (April 24, 2000).
36  3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS p. 568
(2011) [hereinafter ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD].
37  See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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trusts in significant numbers.38 An empirical study found that roughly
$100 billion in trust assets had flowed into states allowing perpetual
trusts.39 The study was based on data through 2003 from the annual
reports that institutional trustees file with federal banking authorities.
Considerably more wealth has undoubtedly moved into these states
in the years following 2003.40 Moreover, the $100 billion figure
undercounts the actual value of trust assets flowing into these states,
because the sources on which the study was based were reports from
federal regulatory agencies.41 These reports contain no data on trusts
in which the trustee is a family trust company, organized under state
law for the limited purpose of administering trusts of one family.
Family trust companies, which are becoming popular vehicles for
administering perpetual trusts of the very wealthy,42 are regulated if
38  Charitable trusts, by contrast, have traditionally been allowed to operate in perpetuity
(and many do), but charitable trusts are subject to two safeguards that make the perpetuity
tolerable: (1) the public benefit standard and (2) judicial modification under cy pres when
circumstances cause the settlor’s design to become outmoded. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS §§ 28, 67 (2003); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 405, 413. .
39  See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410 (2005).
The study found that the states that attracted the most perpetual-trust business were those
that do not tax trust income produced by funds originating from out of state. See id. States
that levy an income tax on trust funds attracted from out of state experienced no observable
increase in trust business. See id. at 420. 
The $100 billion trust figure did not represent the value of GST-exempt perpetual
trusts. It appears that the payoff for institutional trustees operating in these perpetual-trust
states is that “high net worth clients” create perpetual trusts up to the GST exemption limit
and also move the greater bulk of their wealth into non-exempt trusts with the same
institutional trustee. See MADOFF, supra note 30, at 80-82 (noting that “Congress created a
marketing bonanza for banks and trust companies” and that perpetual trusts have “been
tremendously profitable for banks and other financial service companies, which can generate
large fees administering these long term trusts.”). 
40  Writing in 2011, the year after Congress raised the exemption to $5 million (see
supra note 29), Michael Graetz noted that the increase prompted the wealthy to move even
more assets into perpetual trusts: “I know of more than $1 billion in New York City alone.”
Michael J. Graetz, The Politics and Policy of the Estate Tax—Past, Present, and Future 11
(Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 425, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.co,/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1755161. From 1990 to 1991, Professor
Graetz served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy in the Treasury Department. See
also WILMINGTON TRUST, A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF A
DELAWARE DYNASTY TRUST, https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/repositories/
wtc_sitecontent/PDF/ Window_of_Opportunity.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2012) (“Using the
increased exemptions to fund a trust, particularly a Delaware Dynasty Trust, can be a great
way to benefit future generations.”).
41  See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 39, at 387-88.
42  See Goodwin, supra note 30, at 467-68 (noting that family trust companies are
generally thought to be appropriate only for families with a net worth of at least $200
million). See also Alan V. Ytterberg & James P. Weller, Managing Family Wealth Through
11
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at all by state law,43 not federal law, and consequently do not report
to federal agencies. 
IV. FROM HERE TO ETERNITY: PERPETUAL TRUSTS IN ACTION44
The perpetual trusts that are now in existence are only in their
first, second, or third decades, so experience with them as they
continue past the boundary set by traditional perpetuity law is lacking.
Nevertheless, some projections can be made, since the prototypical
perpetual trust is a discretionary trust for the benefit of the settlor’s
descendants from time to time living forever (or for several
centuries).45 
A. Genetic Dilution
With each step down the generational ladder, the settlor’s genetic
relationship with the descendant-beneficiaries will decline rather
precipitously. On average, and disregarding nongenetic descendants
such as adoptees, a settlor’s genetic relationship with his or her
descendants is cut in half at each succeeding generation. At the 14th
generation (i.e., the generation born about 300 years after the settlor’s
death), the settlor’s genetic relationship is reduced to about 0.0061
per cent, which—due to our common origins—is about the same
relationship one has with any randomly selected member of the
population.46
a Private Trust Company, 36 ACTEC L.J. 623, 631-32 (2010).
43  See Goodwin, supra note 30, at 474-75 (noting that family trust companies are
lightly regulated by state law in some states and unregulated by state law in other states). 
44  Portions of Part IV draw on Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The
Folly of Perpetual Trusts (Univ. of Michigan Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
No. 259, 2011, updated May 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975117. The Folly
essay questions whether the state legislators who vote to authorize perpetual trusts and the
wealthy who create them have thought through what are allowing or putting in place. The
essay was featured in the following article in the Wall Street Journal: John Koten, You’re
Dead, But Still in Control, WSJ.MONEY 32 (Spring 2013).
45  See RICHARD W. NENNO, DELAWARE DYNASTY TRUSTS, TOTAL RETURN TRUSTS,
AND ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS 182-84 (2006).
46  See John H. Beckstrom, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 NW. U. L.
REV. 216, 232-33 (1981), citing, at 233, RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 100 (1976).
See also Alina Dizik, Not Your Grandmother’s Genealogy Hobby, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2011,
at D3 (“If you go back far enough, you’re probably connected [genetically] to everyone you
know.”).
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B. Beneficiary Proliferation
As the settlor’s genetic relationship with the beneficiaries
diminishes, the number of descendant-beneficiaries will proliferate
geometrically.47 One hundred and fifty years after creation, a
perpetual trust could have about 450 living beneficiaries; after 250
years, more than 7,000 living beneficiaries; after 350 years, about
114,500 living beneficiaries.48 This means that 350 years after
creation, Michigan Stadium or the Rose Bowl would not be large
enough to hold them all. The beneficiaries, each with standing to
bring a lawsuit against the trustee for violation of any of the trustee’s
fiduciary duties, would have to book Rungrado May Day Stadium in
47  For simplicity, and because there appears to be no empirical evidence on point, the
projections in the text disregard the possibility of two descendants of the settlor having
children together, in a marital relationship or otherwise. To the extent that two of the
settlor’s descendants have children together, the geometric proliferation of the settlor’s
descendants will be dampened, because each pair of parents will, in effect, occupy the place
of one descendant in the family tree. Take, for example, two distant cousins. Although they
are both descendants of the settlor, they might or might not know that and therefore might
or might not know that they are related to one another. If they have children together, they
will only have two children on average rather than two each, and the dampening effect will
cascade down the affected descending lines. Moreover, the dampening effect will be greater
the earlier it happens and the more often it happens. Although marriage between first cousins
is prohibited in about half of the states (see Wikipedia, Cousin Marriage Law in the United
States by State, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cousin_marriage_ law_in_the_United_States_
by_state (last visited Jan. 21, 2012)), marriage between more distant relatives is not
prohibited. The phenomenon of two relatives having children together also affects the
proliferation of ancestors, as described in Wikipedia, Pedigree Collapse,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pedigree_collapse (last visited Jan. 21, 2012). Although the
phenomenon discussed in this footnote could lead to fewer beneficiaries than projected in
the text, another phenomenon—increased longevity, resulting in four or more generations
living at any one time—cuts the other way. See infra note 55. My thanks to Howard
Helsinger for pointing out to me the possibility of two descendants of the settlor having
children together. 
48  The projections are based on the following averages: life expectancy of 75 years, two
children per couple, and 25-year separation between generations. The projections are also
based on the assumption that the trust was created when the settlor had two children and four
grandchildren.
In Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1303, 1339 (2003), the authors greatly underestimate the growth of the number of
beneficiaries. They say that there will only be 16 beneficiaries after 100 years. Like the
projections in the text above, they assume two children per family. Under that assumption,
the only way that such a trust could only have 16 beneficiaries after 100 years—assuming
they mean 100 years after the settlor’s death—would be if they only count the senior
generation. In point of fact, three or more generations of descendants are likely to be living
at the same time, all of whom are permissible recipients of income and/or corpus, which
makes them beneficiaries of the trust. Consequently, 100 years after the settlor’s death, there
are likely to be at least 16 living members of the senior generation, 32 living members of the
middle generation, and 64 living members of the junior generation—112 beneficiaries in all.
13
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Pyongyang, North Korea, or Salt Lake Stadium in Kolkata, India, if
they were to get together for a meeting.49
Disputes seem inevitable. A trustee operates under a strict duty to
distribute trust funds only to those persons who qualify as
beneficiaries under the terms of the trust. A trustee also operates
under the duty of impartiality. In discharging the duty of impartiality,
“a trustee will often find it desirable, and sometimes important or
even necessary, to consult with beneficiaries and obtain information
from them concerning their financial needs and circumstances and
perhaps their preferences concerning matters of trust
administration.”50 
C. Benefiting Strangers
As the trust drifts deeper and deeper into its second and third
centuries and beyond, and long after the settlor and the attorney
responsible for proposing and drafting the trust have died, the
beneficiaries will, to be sure, share a common ancestor, but their
common ancestor will be very remote and they will have branched
into thousands of individual three- or four-generation families
basically unaware of their relationship with all but the closest of the
other branches. Readers of this article can be expected to know their
brothers and sisters (at least those of the whole blood51) and their
descendants, probably their first cousins and their descendants, and
possibly even their second cousins and some or all of their
descendants. But few would know or know of their third or fourth
cousins (descendants of their great-great-grandparents or of their
great-great-great-grandparents), let alone the tens of thousands of
their remote relatives in more distant branches.52 
49  See Wikipedia, List of Stadiums by Capacity, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_stadiums_by_capacity (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
50  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. d (2007). For more on trustee duties and
risks of liability regarding perpetual trusts, see 3 ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD,
supra note 36, at pp. 558-60. Note also that the Uniform Trust Code, in a bracketed
provision, requires the trustee to notify all qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who
have attained 25 years of age of the existence of the trust, the identity of the trustee, and their
right to require trustee’s reports, and provides that this duty of notification cannot be
overridden by the terms of the trust. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (2010); Thomas P.
Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595 (2007).
51  In an age of multiple marriages and other formal and informal multiple relationships,
some might not know or know of all of their half brothers and sisters.
52  On one author’s use of genealogy websites to discover that he has thousands of
living remote relatives with whom he has no personal relationships, see A.J. Jacobs, Are You
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Whether or not politics still makes strange bedfellows,53 perpetual
trusts certainly do. Imagine a perpetual trust in which the more-than-
100,000 living beneficiaries include President Barack Obama and his
descendants and former President George H.W. Bush and his
descendants (including former President George W. Bush). Or, a
perpetual trust in which the more-than-100,000 living beneficiaries
include President Obama and his descendants, former Vice President
Richard Cheney and his descendants, and the living descendants of
former President Harry S. Truman. Both trusts would exist and still
be operating today if Samuel Hinckley, who died in Massachusetts in
1662, had created a perpetual trust for his descendants and if Mareen
Duvall, who died in Maryland in 1694, had created a perpetual trust
for his descendants.54 
D. Table Projecting Settlor’s Descending Line 
Through the Twentieth Generation
The following table projects a settlor’s descending line through
the twentieth generation and shows the number of descendants and
their genetic relationship to the settlor at each generational level. The
number of living beneficiaries is calculated by adding the number of
descendants born in a generation to the number of descendants born
in the two prior generations.55 For example, the projection of about
M y  C o u s i n ? ,  N . Y .  T I M E S ,  J a n .  3 1 ,  2 0 1 4 ,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/opinion/sunday/are-you-my-cousin.html?_r=1. 
53  The maxim that politics makes strange bedfellows was coined by the American
essayist Charles Dudley Warner (1829-1900). 
54  The distant relationships between President Obama and former Presidents Bush and
Truman and former Vice-President Cheney were first chronicled on the website of the New
England Historic Genealogical Society, http://www.newenglandancestors.org/
about/7320.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 2009; website no longer available) (print copy on file
with author). The website also noted that other distant relatives of President Obama include
the following deceased individuals and their descendants: President Gerald R. Ford
(common ancestor: Joseph Holley, who died in Massachusetts in 1647); President Lyndon
B. Johnson (common ancestor: Philip Ament, who died in Kentucky in 1836); President
James Madison, Jr. (common ancestor: Edwin Conway, who died in Virginia in 1675);
British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill (common ancestor: George Allen, who died
in Massachusetts in 1648); and Confederate General Robert E. Lee (common ancestor:
Richard Eltonhead, who died in Lancashire, England, after 1664). Information regarding the
ancestry of all American presidents is collected in GARY BOYD ROBERTS, ANCESTORS OF
AMERICAN PRESIDENTS (2009). 
55  Although the possibility of two relatives having children together in a descending
line will dampen the geometric proliferation of descendants (see supra note 47), the
conservative assumption that only three generations of descendants will be living at any one
time cuts the other way. Even today, four-generation families are increasingly common, and
15
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114,500 living beneficiaries 350 years after the trust is created is
calculated by adding the number of descendants born in the 16th
generation (65,536) to the number of descendants born in the 15th
generation (32,768) and in the 14th generation (16,384). The
assumption is that 350 years after the trust is created, there will be
about 16,384 living members of the senior generation, about 32,768
living members of the middle generation, and about 65,536 living
members of the youngest generation, all of whom would be
beneficiaries of a discretionary trust to distribute income or principal
or both to or for the benefit of the settlor’s descendants living from
time to time. 
Gener-
ation
Settlor’s Descendants Projected
Through the 20th Generation
Number of
Years
Born After
Settlor’s
Death
Number of
Descendants
Per
Generation
Genetic
Relationship
to Settlor
1st Children Settlor
Alive
2 50%
2nd Grandchildren Settlor
Alive
4 25%
3rd Great-grandchildren 25 8 12.5%
4th Great-great-grandchildren 50 16 6.25%
5th Great-great-great-grandchildren 75 32 3.125%
6th Great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
100 64 1.5625%
7th Great-great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
125 128 0.78125%
8th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
150 256 0.390625%
9th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-grandchildren
175 512 0.1953125%
10th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-grandchildren
200 1,024 0.0976562%
if, as expected (see, e.g., SONIA ARRISON, 100 PLUS: HOW THE COMING AGE OF LONGEVITY
WILL CHANGE EVERYTHING 21-47 (2011)), longevity increases over the next several
centuries, five- or maybe six-generation families might become common. Assuming that all
the other assumptions (such as the number of children per family and the 25-year interval
between generations) remain the same, the existence of four-, five-, or even six-generation
families would cause the number of living beneficiaries at any one time to be greater than
projected. 
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11th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-grandchildren
225 2,048 0.0488281%
12th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
250 4,096 0.024414%
13th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
275 8,192 0.012207%
14th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
300 16,384 0.0061035%
15th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-grandchildren
325 32,768 0.0030517%
16th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-grandchildren
350 65,536 0.0015258%
17th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-grandchildren
375 131,072 0.0007629%
18th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
400 262,144 0.0003814%
19th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
425 524,288 0.0001907%
20th Great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
great-great-great-great-great-great-
grandchildren
450 1,048,576 0.0000953%
Is the beneficiary proliferation projected above inevitable? Some
model perpetual-trust documents incorporate an “escape clause” in
the form of a nongeneral power of appointment granted to each
descendant-beneficiary or perhaps to the senior member of each
branch to distribute his or her share of trust principal outright to his
or her descendants (or perhaps to a broader group of permissible
appointees).56 For tax reasons, these powers must be nongeneral,
meaning that the powerholder cannot withdraw assets for his or her
own benefit.57 Because it is impossible to predict how often these
56  See, e.g., NENNO, supra note 45, at 183.
57  See I.R.C. §§ 2041, 2514. Powers are nongeneral if the powerholders cannot
17
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powers exist and will actually be exercised, the most that can be said
is that the number of beneficiaries projected above will be reduced to
the extent that one or more beneficiaries exercises the power.58 A
deterrent to exercise is that any exercise constitutes a partial
termination of the trust, and the amounts the powerholder directs to
be distributed to his or her descendants or other permissible
appointees lose the tax umbrella of the GST exemption. Note also
that the typical perpetual trust is a discretionary trust, so escape
clauses pose a potential source of dispute and possible litigation:
determining a powerholder’s exact share of principal. Each exercise
or partial exercise requires a recalculation of the powerholder’s share
and poses a potential source of litigation over the accuracy of the
recalculation. Calculations and recalculations are not likely to likely
to be problematic in the first few generations, but are likely to become
more and more disputable the deeper down the generational ladder
the trust goes as the family divides into hundreds and then thousands
of branches. 
E. Other Concerns
Genetic dilution and beneficiary proliferation are not the only
concerns associated with perpetual trusts.59 Other concerns include
rising management costs, trust document obsolescence, and trustee
turnover.
1. Rising management costs. As these trusts continue to operate
beyond and then far beyond the traditional perpetuity boundary of
about a century, the costs of trust administration could become
significant and be a drag on performance. As the settlor’s descending
line divides and redivides into hundreds and then thousands of
distribute assets to themselves, their estates, their creditors, or the creditors of their estates.
See ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, § 17.3; UNIF. POWERS OF
APPOINTMENT ACT § 102 (2013). For rules governing the exercise of a nongeneral power,
see ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, § 19.14; UNIF. POWERS OF
APPOINTMENT ACT § 305 (2013).
58  One of the architects of the perpetual-trust movement cautions against exercise:
“[G]etting assets out of a trust is as easy as getting toothpaste out of a tube, while putting
assets back into a trust is as difficult as trying to get toothpaste back into the tube.” Garrett
Moritz, Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2588,
2605 (2003) (Jan. 9, 2003, telephone interview by Moritz with Jonathon G. Blattmachr).
59  Lucy Marsh has written that the genetic dilution and beneficiary proliferation should
“in [themselves], demonstrate the foolishness of Dynasty Trusts.” See Lucy A. Marsh, The
Demise of Dynasty Trusts: Returning the Wealth to the Family, 5 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP.
L.J. 23, 50 (2012-2013).
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branches, the trustee would have to employ and assign more and more
trust officers, each with primary operational responsibility—aided by
ever-advancing technologies—for a manageable number of branches.
The terms of the trust might attempt to anticipate this problem by
providing that the original trust be divided and redivided into sub-
trusts or separate shares, perhaps as each member of the senior
generation of a branch dies. If the terms of the trust do not so provide,
the original trust would by necessity have to be divided and redivided
defacto into multiple sub-trusts or separate shares. Still another
possibility is for the fiduciary to exercise a “decanting power” to
divide and redivide the trust into sub-trusts.60 Because the aggregate
number of beneficiaries of all of the sub-trusts or shares would equal
the number of beneficiaries of a single trust, the result would
constitute a change in form only and, in any event, would not slow
down the severe genetic dilution that occurs with the birth of each
new generation. 
Just as disputes seem inevitable concerning the identity of the
beneficiaries,61 they also seem inevitable concerning the proper
manner of the hundreds and maybe thousands of divisions,
redivisions, and re-redivisions that the trustees will have to make over
the centuries. Ironically, as trust administration becomes more and
more cumbersome and litigation prone, the trustees
themselves—whose long-deceased and forgotten predecessors had
lobbied so hard to capture the perpetual-trust business—might find it
necessary to mount an effort to change current trust law by lobbying
state legislatures to grant them the power to modify or terminate the
60  A “decanting power” is a fiduciary power of appointment endemic in discretionary
trusts that allows the trustee—without judicial oversight—to modify the terms of the original
trust by creating a new trust with different terms. Under the ALI’s Property Restatement
Third, the holder of a “decanting power” cannot exercise the power beyond its scope and the
holder’s exercise is subject to fiduciary obligations. See ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT
THIRD, supra note 36, § 17.1 cmt. g; § 19.14 cmts. f & g(4); § 19.15; Morse v. Kraft, 468
Mass. 92, 95 (2013) (citing the ALI’s Property Restatement Third § 17.1 cmt. g with
approval); Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the Third and Final Volume of the New
Restatement of Property That Estate Planners Should Know About, 38 ACTEC L.J. 23, 40-
41 (2012). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 (2003). The Treasury Department
and the IRS are considering the tax consequences of some of the more aggressive uses of the
“decanting power” under non-uniform “decanting” statutes. See IRS Notice 2011-101,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-101.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). The Uniform Law
Commission is currently working on a uniform trust decanting act. See UNIF. TRUST
D E C A N T I N G  A C T  ( n o w  i n  d r a f t  f o r m ) ,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Trust%20Decanting. 
61  See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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trusts or by petitioning state courts to modify or terminate them.62
2. Trust document obsolescence. State-of-the-art perpetual-trust
documents of today are considered modern, sophisticated, and up-to-
date.63 Will those documents be looked upon as modern,
sophisticated, and up-to-date centuries from now? Consider the
devices used centuries ago by English landowners to control family
estates through subsequent generations. Such devices, which were
then considered modern, sophisticated, and up-to-date, first took the
form of the unbarrable entail and, after the entail became barrable, the
strict settlement.64 These devices and the terminology associated with
them became obsolete long ago. If the past is any guide to the future,
an early 21st century perpetual-trust document will seem as obsolete
to those in distant centuries as a 17th century document appears to us
today.65 Moreover, a perpetual-trust document drafted today will often
define the class of descendants according to time-of-creation
standards, standards that run the serious risk of becoming out of date
as concepts of family change over time. No trust drafted in 1650 or
62  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 48, at 1339-42. Trustees might seek to apply
the doctrine of equitable deviation, which authorizes a court to modify the terms of a trust
if, due to circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, the modification will further the
purposes of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003) (unanticipated
circumstances); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 (unanticipated circumstances). Whether the
equitable-deviation doctrine can be used to modify a perpetual trust has yet to be decided.
Alternatively, trustees might seek to extend the charitable trust doctrine of cy pres (see supra
note 38) to private trusts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003) (cy pres); UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 413 (cy pres). Far more likely, trustees would use their “decanting power”
to modify the trust. See supra note 60 & infra text accompanying notes 109-110.
63  For a model perpetual-trust document, see, e.g., NENNO, supra note 45, at 182-94.
64  See, e.g., LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 1601-1740: THE ADOPTION OF
THE STRICT SETTLEMENT (1983); JOHN HABAKKUK, MARRIAGE, DEBT, AND THE ESTATE
SYSTEM: ENGLISH LANDOWNERSHIP 1650-1950, at 1-5, 17, 36, 46-47 (1994); SIMPSON,
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 10, at 143-62 (contrasting the English and Scottish entails);
EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN ENGLAND, 1300
TO 1800 (1993). 
65  Ruth Deech also notes how the passage of time can make a trust document obsolete:
“If a settlor or testator had total liberty to dispose of his property among future beneficiaries,
the recipients, being fettered by his wishes, would never enjoy that same freedom in their
turn. The liberty to make fresh rearrangements of assets is necessary not only in order to be
rid of irksome conditions attached by earlier donors to the enjoyment of income but also in
order to be able to manoeuvre in the light of new tax laws, changes in the nature of the
property and in the personal circumstances of the beneficiaries, unforeseeable by the best-
intentioned and most perspicacious of donors.” Ruth Deech, Lives in Being Revived, 97 LAW
Q. REV. 593, 594 (1981). Some of the obsolescence problems Deech points to, especially
the tax problems, might be cured today by the exercise of a “decanting power” (see Diana
S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax Effects of Decanting—Obtaining and Preserving
the Benefits, 111 J. TAX’N 288 (Nov. 2009)), or by judicial modification (see infra note 96). 
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earlier could have contained provisions anticipating the possibility of
adopted children,66 children of assisted reproduction, or children born
to a surrogate mother, much less second-parent adoptions or
posthumously conceived children. Likewise, no perpetual-trust
document drafted today will be able to anticipate concepts of family
and descent as they change and adjust over the next several centuries.
3. Trustee turnover. Another matter that should be of concern to
the wealthy who create perpetual trusts is what entity is going to serve
as trustee over these vast intervals? In an era in which banks and
other financial institutions go out of business, merge, or are taken
over by other banks or financial institutions,67 the bank or financial
institution originally selected will not likely continue in anything like
its present form for the next 200 years, 300 years, or for eternity. Over
vast intervals such as these, the identity, location, capabilities, and
expertise of the trustee will likely change many times over. Trustee
turnover is enough of a problem for a trust whose duration is within
the traditional perpetuity limit of about a century. The problem will
be far more acute for a trust spanning several centuries or lasting
forever. As the beneficiaries grow into the tens of thousands and
divide into thousands of branches mostly unknown to one another, the
personnel and technology necessary to administer a trust with fifteen
or fewer beneficiaries (two children, four grandchildren, and as many
as eight great-grandchildren) will not look anything like the personnel
and technology necessary to manage a trust with 100,000 or more
beneficiaries. Settlors should be aware that the trustees will become
much different entities than the ones they initially entrusted with their
fortunes.
Settlors should also be aware that the trustees, whether they are
or are not the ones initially entrusted with their fortunes, will have the
power to modify the terms of the original trust through what has come
to be known as the “decanting power.”68
66  Adoption was first authorized in England in 1926. See Adoption of Children Act
1926. In the United States, adoption began to be authorized in the mid-19th century. See
E.W. CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY OF ADOPTION 11
(1998).
67  According to SNL Financial, “[m]ore than a dozen trust companies were swallowed
by bigger institutions [in 2011].” Robin Sidel, A Family Loses Its Faith in Trust, WALL ST.
J., March 22, 2012, at C3.
68  See supra note 60; infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
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V. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE DECLARES THE PERPETUAL-
TRUST MOVEMENT “ILL ADVISED” AND LIMITS DEAD-HAND
CONTROL TO TWO YOUNGER GENERATIONS69
The traditional limit on dead-hand control of a life in being plus
twenty-one years allows trusts or other property arrangements to
continue for about a century, which is an extraordinarily long period
of time. Writing more than four decades ago, W. Barton Leach
cautioned settlors and their lawyers against using the full perpetuity
period: 
I hasten to add that the wisdom of tying up property for anything like
a century is quite another matter. Any lawyer whose wisdom is equal to his
skill would surely advise against any such attempt. Such a lawyer could
point out that it would have been utterly impossible for any testator dying
in 1866 to foresee the events that have taken place in the succeeding
century, and . . . any prediction as to what may occur in the century
following 1966 would be even more unlikely to conform to reality.70
Regarding the wisdom of allowing property to be tied up, not for
a “mere” century, but for many centuries and maybe forever, it is
worth noting that the members of the American Law Institute
discussed the perpetual-trust movement at their 2010 annual meeting
and voted unanimously to adopt the following statement: “It is the
considered judgment of the American Law Institute that the recent
statutory movement allowing the creation of perpetual or near-
perpetual trusts is ill advised.”71 The farther a perpetual trust moves
69  Portions of Part V draw on Lawrence W. Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand Control:
The American Law Institute Declares the Perpetual-Trust Movement Ill Advised (Univ. of
Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 199, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1614934; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute
Proposes a New Approach to Perpetuities: Limiting the Dead Hand to Two Younger
Generations (Univ. of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 200, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1614936.
70   W. BARTON LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDICTED! 71 (1967). 
71  See 3 ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, at p. 564; Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand Control: The American Law Institute Declares the
Perpetual-Trust Movement Ill Advised (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 199,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1614934. Mark Ascher was more blunt: He
described the movement as “loony.” Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to
the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2011) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD
HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE (2009)). 
For a defense of perpetual trusts, see Bridget J. Crawford, Who Is Afraid of Perpetual
Trusts?, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 79 (2012). It bears noting that when
Professor Crawford was in private practice with a large New York City law firm, she and a
co-author praised what they called the “power of the new perpetual trusts now permissible
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in time beyond the traditional perpetuity boundary of about a century,
the more the trust will become little more than one for thousands
upon thousands of strangers, not only to the long-deceased settlor but
also mostly to each other.72 
At the same annual meeting, the American Law Institute also took
a fresh look at the traditional mechanism for limiting excessive dead-
hand control and adopted a new approach to perpetuities.73 The new
approach limits dead-hand control to two younger generations. In
general terms, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers (ALI’s Property Restatement Third) provides that
a trust or other donative disposition of property is subject to judicial
modification to the extent that it does not terminate on or before the
expiration of the perpetuity period. The perpetuity period expires at
the death of the last living measuring life, defined as a group
composed of the settlor and the beneficiaries of the disposition who
are no more than two generations younger than the settlor. In terms
of a trust for direct descendants, the two-younger-generations rule
means that a settlor can establish a trust for the benefit of his or her
children and grandchildren, with ultimate distribution on the death
of the last living grandchild to the settlor’s then-living great-
grandchildren and descendants of deceased great-grandchildren.
Earlier, this article noted the three features of the common-law
Rule that bear reexamination. The first—that the common-law Rule
invalidated a contingent future interest on the basis of what might
happen, not on the basis of what does happen—was remedied by the
adoption of wait-and-see in the Restatement (Second) of Property:
Donative Transfers (ALI’s Property Restatement Second) and then in
USRAP. The ALI’s Property Restatement Third continues the wait-
and-see approach but drops the two-tier feature. Under the ALI’s
Property Restatement Third, wait-and-see is applied without regard
under Alaska law” and promoted them “for wealthy US citizens and non-US persons holding
substantial US real property or stock.” See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Bridget J. Crawford,
Wilderness No More: Alaska as the New “Offshore” Trust Jurisdiction, AMICUS CURIAE 30,
30 (Nov. 1999), available at http://journals.sas.ac.uk/amicus/article/view/1424 (last visited
Aug. 17, 2012).
72  As Ascher concluded, “in the final analysis, the only real beneficiaries will be
trustees and the lawyers,” adding: “Is it any wonder that elements of the financial-services
industry lobbied so hard for the necessary legislation?” Ascher, supra note 71, at 1161. 
73  See ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, §§ 27.1 to 27.3;
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute Proposes a New Approach to
Perpetuities: Limiting the Dead Hand to Two Younger Generations (Univ. of Mich. Pub.
Law Working Paper No. 200, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1614936.
23
Waggoner:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2014
24 Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why?
to whether or not the contingent future interest would be valid under
the common-law Rule. The old learning under the common-law Rule
that has perplexed generations of law students would be relegated to
the dustbins of legal history.
The ALI’s Property Restatement Third also addresses the second
and third features. The second feature is that the common-law Rule
and its wait-and-see variant measures the allowable perpetuity period
by lives in being at the creation of the interest (the measuring lives)
plus twenty-one years. Requiring the measuring lives to be in being
at the creation of the interest prevents the perpetuity period from
adjusting to the trust and family circumstances, because that
requirement often divides members of the same generation into
measuring and non-measuring lives. Although trusts commonly
confer lifetime benefits on members of one generation before passing
benefits to the next generation, the life-in-being requirement means
that only those members of a generation who are in being at the
creation of the interest can be used to measure the perpetuity period.
Members of the same generation who come into being later cannot be
used. The ALI’s Property Restatement Third replaces the “in being”
requirement with a rule that measures the perpetuity period by
generations. Basically, with certain qualifications and exceptions, the
Rule—as promulgated in the ALI’s Property Restatement
Third—limits dead-hand control to granting benefits through but not
beyond two generations younger than the settlor. The result is that the
perpetuity period is more likely to be tailored to the individual trust
and family circumstances. 
The third feature of the common-law Rule and its wait-and-see
variant is that the common law focuses only on the validity of a
contingent future interest, not on the time when a trust or other
donative disposition of property terminates. The Rule has been called
a rule against remoteness of vesting. That mechanism, however, is
satisfied if a contingent future interest vests in interest within the
allowable period; it need not vest in possession. Consequently, a rule
against remoteness of vesting is not directly aligned with the purpose
of the Rule, which is to limit dead-hand control. The ALI’s Property
Restatement Third focuses on the time when the trust or other
disposition of property terminates.74 The time of termination as
74  The idea of changing the Rule Against Perpetuities to require termination on or
before the expiration of the perpetuity period was first proposed by Daniel M. Schuyler and
recently advocated by Thomas P. Gallanis. See Daniel M. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against
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opposed to the time of vesting coordinates more purposively with the
Rule’s objective of limiting dead-hand control, because the time of
termination is when the property comes under the control of the
ultimate beneficiaries. Another benefit of shifting from the time of
vesting to the time of termination is that the distinction between a
contingent and a vested future interest—another feature of future
interests law that has bedeviled generations of law
students—becomes irrelevant.75 
Judicial modification is an integral part of the Rule Against
Perpetuities adopted in the ALI’s Property Restatement Third, as it
was under the ALI’s Property Restatement Second and USRAP.76
Under the ALI’s Property Restatement Third, a trust or other donative
disposition that does not terminate on or before the expiration of the
perpetuity period is not invalid. The property does not return to and
then through the estate of the long-deceased settlor. Instead, the trust
or other donative disposition is subject to judicial modification “in a
manner that most closely approximates the transferor’s manifested
plan of distribution and is within the [ALI’s Property Restatement
Third’s perpetuity period].”77 In most cases, the form of modification
will accelerate the right to possession of the beneficiaries of the trust
or other disposition. 
As noted above, gone also is the two-tier approach. Under the
ALI’s Property Restatement Third, there is no need to test a
disposition to see if it would have been valid at common law. Of
course, any trust or other donative disposition whose terms require it
Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1958); Thomas P. Gallanis, The
Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 549, 559-60 (2003).
75  Another feature of the ALI’s Property Restatement Third is that it classifies futures
interests on the basis of substance, not form. Categories no longer recognized are “executory
interest,” “possibility of reverter,” “right of entry,” and “vested subject to defeasance.” A
future interest is “either a reversion or a remainder” and is “either contingent or vested.” A
“contingent” future interest is no longer defined as a future interest that is subject to a
condition precedent, but rather as a future interest that “might not take effect in possession
or enjoyment.” A “vested” future interest is no longer defined as a future interest that is
subject to no condition or a condition subsequent, but a future interest that is “certain to take
effect in possession or enjoyment.” See ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note
36, §§ 25.2, 25.3; Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute Proposes
Simplifying the Doctrine of Estates (Univ. of Michigan Public Law Working Paper No. 198,
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612878; Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV.
729 (1972). 
76  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.5 (1983);
UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 3 (1986) (UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-903).
77  ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, § 27.2.
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to terminate no later than the expiration of the two-younger-
generations perpetuity period is valid from its inception and will
never be subject to judicial modification. 
Illustration 1. Settlor creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust, directing
the trustee to pay the income “to my daughter C for life, then in equal
shares to C’s children for their respective lives; on the death of each child,
the proportionate share of trust principal of the one so dying shall be
distributed by representation to the then living descendants of such child.”
When Settlor created the trust, C had one child, GC1. After Settlor created
the trust but before Settlor died, C and her husband (H1) were divorced.
Subsequently, C remarried and she and her second husband (H2) had a
child (GC2). Settlor then died. After Settlor’s death, C and H2 had another
child (GC3). C and GC1 were in being at the creation of the trust but they
have now died survived by GC2 and GC3. GC3 outlived C, GC1, and
GC2 by more than twenty-one years. 
Under the ALI’s Property Restatement Third, the trust would be valid
at its outset, because its terms require the trust to terminate no later than
the death of the survivor of Settlor and Settlor’s last living grandchild. The
trust will never be subject to judicial modification. The measuring lives
would be Settlor, C, GC1, GC2, and GC3. If the measuring lives were
limited to those in being at the creation of the interest, only Settlor, C, and
GC1 could qualify as measuring lives. Although GC2 and GC3 came into
being after the creation of the trust, GC2 and GC3 would be measuring
lives under the ALI’s Property Restatement Third, because GC2 and GC3
are beneficiaries who are related to Settlor in the second generation below
Settlor’s generation. Treating GC2 and GC3 as measuring lives means that
the trust would be valid and not subject to judicial modification. 
To put the generations-based perpetuity period into perspective,
it should be noted that the common-law Rule itself would not cut a
two-generations trust short. In Illustration 1, the only effect of
violating the common-law Rule would be to invalidate the remainder
interest to C’s then-living descendants that was to take effect on the
death of C’s last living child (Settlor’s grandchild), thus forcing the
right to the trust principal to revert to Settlor’s estate on the death of
GC3 (Settlor’s last living grandchild). Because Settlor would
typically have died many decades earlier, the final owners of the right
to trust principal could only be determined by tracing the reversion
through the estates of those successors who also died before the
termination of the trust. It would not be unusual to find that some and
perhaps most or all of the final owners were far removed from
Settlor’s family. The two-generations approach does nothing more
than save the validity of the remainder interest, thus preserving
Settlor’s intention regarding the ultimate distributees of the trust and
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removing the inefficiency of forcing the right to the trust principal to
revert to and through Settlor’s estate and then through the estates of
Settlor’s successors.
Here is how a perpetual trust would fare under the ALI’s Property
Restatement Third: 
Illustration 2. Settlor creates an irrevocable inter vivos trust, directing
the trustee to distribute the income at the trustee’s discretion among
Settlor’s descendants from time to time living. The terms of the trust
require the trust to terminate when Settlor no longer has any living
descendants. On termination, the trustee is directed to distribute the trust
principal to a specified charity. At the creation of the trust, Settlor had two
adult children, C1 and C2, and two grandchildren, GC1 and GC2. After
the trust was created, two more grandchildren, GC3 and GC4, were born.
GC4 was born after Settlor’s death. 
Under the ALI’s Property Restatement Third, the measuring lives
would be Settlor and Settlor’s children and grandchildren, C1, C2, GC1,
GC2, GC3, and GC4. Suppose that GC4 was the last living measuring life
and that GC4 has now died, say at age 88. GC4's death would mark the
expiration of the perpetuity period. At GC4's death, Settlor had fifty living
descendants—eight great-grandchildren, sixteen great-great-grandchildren,
and twenty-six great-great-great-grandchildren. The trust would be subject
to judicial modification, because the trust did not terminate on or before
the expiration of the perpetuity period. The court should modify the trust
by requiring it to terminate on the death of GC4 and order the trust
principal to be distributed by representation to Settlor’s descendants living
when the perpetuity period expired. If Settlor’s descending line had died
out when or before the perpetuity period expired, no modification would
be required, because the trust would have required distribution to the
specified charity when Settlor’s last living descendant died.
The objective of switching to a generations-based perpetuity
period is not to produce a materially longer or shorter maximum
period.78 Under the traditional lives-in-being approach, the longest-
living individual who serves as a measuring life will eventually die,
but that individual can be someone who is more than two generations
younger than the settlor and can outlive the settlor by many decades,
maybe even a century, but not much more and often less. Under the
two-younger-generations approach, the longest-living individual who
serves as a measuring life will eventually die, but that individual can
be someone who is conceived and born after the settlor’s death and
can outlive the settlor by many decades, maybe even a century, but
not much more and often less. Although the length of the two periods
78  See 3 ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, at pp. 569-70. 
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will be different in individual cases, the average length across all
cases will probably work out to be about the same.
The generations-based perpetuity period will potentially be
shorter than one based on lives in being if the settlor dies after the
birth or conception of all of the beneficiaries of the settlor’s trust who
are members of the second generation below the settlor’s generation.
In the case of a trust benefiting the settlor’s descendants, that situation
is one in which the settlor dies after all of his or her grandchildren are
born or in gestation. Due to increased longevity, many settlors live
long enough to see all of their grandchildren and some of their great-
grandchildren. Under the two-younger-generations-based perpetuity
period, the measuring lives would include the grandchildren but
would not include the in-being great-grandchildren. Under the lives-
in-being-based perpetuity period, the measuring lives would not only
include the grandchildren but would also include the in-being great-
grandchildren.
The generations-based perpetuity period will potentially be longer
than one based on lives in being if the settlor dies before the birth or
conception of all of the beneficiaries of the settlor’s trust who are
members of the second generation below the settlor’s generation. In
the case of a trust benefiting the settlor’s descendants, that situation
is one in which the settlor dies before all of his or her grandchildren
are born or in gestation. The situation in which a settlor does have
one or more after-born grandchildren is likely to arise when one or
more of the settlor’s children has a second marriage and a second
family, as depicted in Illustration 1. When there is an after-born
grandchild, the two-generations approach potentially produces a
longer perpetuity period than the in-being approach, but not
appreciably longer, and has the overriding benefit of tailoring the
period to the individual trust and family circumstance. The perpetuity
period will not always be longer because, even in cases in which the
settlor does have one or more after-born grandchildren, the two-
generation perpetuity period will still not be longer than the lives-in-
being period unless one or more of the after-born grandchildren
outlives the settlor’s in-being grandchildren.
In the case of a trust benefiting the descendants of a much
younger sibling, there is a greater likelihood that the settlor will die
before all of the siblings’s grandchildren are born or in gestation. By
contrast, in the case of a trust benefiting the descendants of a much
older sibling, there is a far less likelihood that the settlor will die
before all of the sibling’s grandchildren are born or in gestation. The
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two situations—younger sibling, older sibling—seem to cancel each
other out.
Although the principal innovation of the ALI’s Property
Restatement Third is the imposition of a two-younger-generations
limit on dead-hand control, the new Restatement incorporates other
innovations. One is that there is no twenty-one-year period
automatically tacked on at the end of the perpetuity period as there
was at common law and under the ALI’s Property Restatement
Second. Although the tack-on twenty-one-year period was a period in
gross and not tied to the actual minority of any beneficiary, it is
generally understood that the twenty-one-year period was originally
designed to allow the settlor to continue the trust or other disposition
throughout the minority of a remainder beneficiary. Under the ALI’s
Property Restatement Third, the tack-on twenty-one-year period is
replaced by a provision specifically targeted to an age contingency
that has not yet been satisfied. If, upon the expiration of the perpetuity
period, the share of a beneficiary is distributable upon reaching a
specified age and the beneficiary is younger than the earlier of the
specified age or the age of thirty, the beneficiary’s share may, without
judicial modification, be retained in trust until the beneficiary reaches
or dies before reaching the earlier of the specified age or the age of
thirty. 
Illustration 3. Settlor dies, leaving a will that devises property in trust,
directing the trustee to pay the income “to my son C for life, then to C’s
children for the life of the survivor, and on the death of C’s last surviving
child, to distribute the trust principal to C’s grandchildren who reach the
age of 30.” At Settlor’s death, Settlor had one child, C, and one
grandchild, GC1. After Settlor’s death, C had another child, GC2. C had
no more children. 
Under the ALI’s Property Restatement Third, the measuring lives are
C, GC1, and GC2. C died, survived by GC1 and GC2. GC1 then died,
survived by GC2. GC2 has now died. The perpetuity period expired at
GC2's death. At GC2's death, GC1 and GC2 had three children, GGC1,
GGC2, and GGC3. GGC1 was then 28, GGC2 was then 26, and GGC3
was then 22. The shares of GGC1, GGC2, and GGC3 may, without
judicial modification, be retained in trust until each great-grandchild
reaches 30 or dies before reaching 30. The same result would be reached
if the specified age in Settlor’s trust had been age 35. If the specified age
in Settlor’s trust had been age 25, the shares of GGC1 and GGC2 would
be distributable immediately upon GC2's death and the share of GGC3
could be retained in trust until GGC3 either reached the age of 25 or died
before reaching 25. 
In its final innovation, the ALI’s Property Restatement Third
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allows for one exception to the two-younger-generations limit. The
New Restatement specifically authorizes a settlor to establish a trust
or other property arrangement for the sole current benefit of a named
individual who is more than two generations younger than the settlor,
such as a great-grandchild. Requiring the beneficiary to be a named
individual is intended to assure that the beneficiary is in being when
the trust or other property arrangement is established. Among the
types of trusts or other property arrangements that would come under
this provision are a special-needs trust, a “529 educational savings
plan,” a “Coverdale Education Savings Account,” a “section 2503(c)
trust” for a minor, and a custodianship under the Uniform Transfers
to Minors Act, the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, or the Uniform
Custodial Trust Act. 
VI. IT’S UP TO CONGRESS TO FIX WHAT IT INSTIGATED
The primary responsibility for the perpetual-trust movement rests
with Congress and the primary responsibility for stopping it also rests
with Congress. Because of the continued inaction of Congress, the
perpetual-trust floodgates, open far too long, remain open. 
A. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 
Made the Problem Worse
Faced with the prospect of across-the-board tax increases taking
effect automatically on the first day of January 2013, Congress passed
and the president signed the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012
(ATRA 2012).79 
Had the higher tax rates taken effect, the ceiling on the estate, gift,
and GST exemption would have dropped to $1 million. Such a drop
would have curtailed by about eighty percent the ability of the
wealthy to fund perpetual trusts, but ATRA 2012 permanently
extended the $5 million ceiling, which—as adjusted for inflation—is
$5.34 million in 2014 (double that for a married couple).80 
B. Silence of the House Committee on Ways and Means
As a stop-gap measure, ATRA 2012 did not purport to effect
79  Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013). Although Congress passed ATRA 2012
on January 1, 2013, and the president signed it into law the following day, its estate, gift, and
GST tax provisions are effective for donative transfers made after December 31, 2012. 
80  See Rev. Proc. 2013-35 at 18, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-13-35.pdf.
30
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 80 [2014]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/80
Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper (Updated May 2014) 31
comprehensive tax reform. If Congress is to impose a durational limit
on the GST exemption, and hence put an end to the perpetual-trust
movement for good, it might have to come as part of comprehensive
tax reform. Until that happens, the tax incentive for creating perpetual
trusts will remain in place, especially now that ATRA 2012 has made
the $5 million-plus ceiling on the exemption permanent. 
On February 26, 2014, the House Ways and Means Committee
unveiled its long-awaited proposal for comprehensive tax reform.81
The proposal, however, neglects to address the GST exemption for
perpetual trusts: The Committee divided its work into eleven working
groups, but none dealt with estate, gift, and GST tax reform.82 The
prospect for enactment of comprehensive tax reform in this
Congress—the 113th—appears bleak in any event.83
C. Treasury Proposal
The only agency of the federal government that has publicly taken
an interest in curtailing the GST exemption for perpetual trusts is the
Treasury Department. As part of the Obama Administration’s Fiscal
Year 2012, 2013, and 2014 revenue proposals, and reiterated in its
2015 revenue proposals, the Treasury Department stated its position
that the absence of a durational limit on the GST exemption is
inconsistent with the purpose of the exemption and undermines the
policy of the GST tax.84 But Treasury’s proposed solution is
81  Tax Reform Act of 2014 (Discussion Draft), H.R._, 113th Cong., 2d Sess.,
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadfiles/statutory_text_tax_reform_act_of_2014_
discussion_draft__022614.pdf. 
82  For a list of the working groups, see http://waysandmeans.house.gov/taxreform.
83  See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, McConnell: Tax Reform is Dead, WASH. POST
WONKBLOG, Feb. 25, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2014/02/25/breaking-mcconnell-kills-tax-reform/.
84  See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 164-65 (March 2014),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY
2015.pdf (last visited March 5, 2014); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 143-44
(April 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General
Explanations-FY2014.pdf (last visited March 5, 2014); DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 81-82 (Feb. 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf (last visited March 5, 2014);
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
F I S C A L  Y E A R  2 0 1 2  R E V E N U E  P R O P O S A L S  1 2 9 - 3 0 ,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY
2012.pdf (last visited March 5, 2014).
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disappointing because it is not as effective as it could and should be.
Here is what Treasury proposes: 
(1) new trusts (i.e., those created on or after the effective date of enactment)
would qualify for the GST exemption, but the exemption would expire ninety
years after the trust was created; and 
(2) existing trusts (i.e., those created before the effective date of enactment)
would continue to be GST-exempt unburdened by a durational limit.
The high-end estate-planning community would have little
difficulty coping with the Treasury proposal for trusts created on or
after the effective date. The key point is that perpetual trusts would
still qualify for the GST exemption. The only difference would be
that the exemption would expire ninety years after creation. Ninety
years is a very long time. Because the whole tax system might change
during the next several years, let alone the next ninety, the Treasury
proposal encourages the super wealthy to create GST-exempt
perpetual or potentially perpetual trusts, while at the same time
keeping their options open. 
So, post-effective-date GST-exempt trusts would likely take one
of two forms. Some might be crafted with no termination date while
others might be crafted with a ninety-year termination date, but either
way the trustee would be granted the power to adjust the terms of the
trust to take account of tax law as it changes over time.85 The idea
would be that if the GST tax and the ninety-year limit were no longer
in effect as the trust neared its nine-decade mark, the trust could
continue for centuries.86 Only if the GST tax and the ninety-year limit
were still in effect as the trust neared its nine-decade mark would the
trustee have the option of avoiding GST tax by terminating the trust
and distributing the assets on or shortly before expiration of the
ninety-year limit.
The Treasury proposal, if enacted, would also undermine the
85  To be sure, less-shrewdly planned post-effective-date trusts might be crafted to
terminate on or shortly before expiration of the 90-year period without any option of
extending the term of the trust should the law change to make an extended trust more
attractive, but word would spread quickly through the estate-planning community that this
is not the preferred course. 
86  If the GST tax itself were to be repealed before 90 years are up, the trust could
continue for centuries, although repeal would remove the tax-motivated purpose of the trust
in the first place and Congress’s interest in the perpetual-trust movement. Repeal would also
provide an opportunity for the state legislatures to revisit the question whether they still
think it is wise public policy to allow perpetual trusts.
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perpetuity reforms recently adopted by the American Law Institute87
as well as the earlier reform adopted in USRAP. By proposing a
ninety-year durational limit and ignoring the two-younger-generations
limit, the Treasury proposal would deal another blow to state-law
perpetuity reform.88 Although the ninety-year limit is undoubtedly
derived from USRAP, it represents a misunderstanding of USRAP.
As noted earlier, USRAP’s ninety-year period was not applicable to
all trusts, but only to that small percentage of trusts—mostly poorly-
drafted trusts that did not contain a perpetuity-saving clause89—that
(before the perpetual-trust movement took hold) could otherwise
exceed the common-law period of a life in being plus twenty-one
years.90  
Because the Treasury proposal would only affect trusts created on
or after the date of enactment, it would leave many trusts and much
wealth exempt from GST tax for much longer than Congress
originally intended. If the Treasury proposal becomes the solution of
choice, congressional procrastination becomes even more critical:
Wealth will continue to pile up in perpetually tax-exempt trusts until
(and if) Congress decides to move.91
In addition, if enactment of the Treasury proposal would ever
appear possible, the stampede would be on to get even more perpetual
trusts in before the deadline. Word of a possible enactment would
spread quickly through the estate-planning bar and through the
listservs and websites of various organizations such as the American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel and the Real Property Probate
and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association. Super-rich
clients who were on the fence would be encouraged to establish GST-
87  See supra Part V.
88  Enactment of the Treasury proposal by Congress would likely pressure the Uniform
Law Commission to revise USRAP to coincide with the federal durational limit, at least for
post-effective-date GST-exempt trusts.
89  A common-law perpetuity-saving clause provides that the trust must terminate no
later than 21 years after the death of the last survivor of a group of individuals (often the
settlor’s descendants or the beneficiaries of the trust) who were in being when the trust was
created.
90  As the USRAP reporter and inventor of the 90-year wait-and-see period, I know this
to be true. See also supra Part II.
91  The amount of wealth already sheltered in perpetually tax-exempt trusts is estimated
to be in the billions of dollars. See notes 6, 29, 39-40. See also Zachary R. Mider, Moguls
Rent South Dakota Addresses to Shelter Wealth Forever, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 27, 2013,
h t t p : / / w w w . b l o o m b e r g . c o m / n e w s / 2 0 1 3 - 1 2 - 2 7 / m o g u l s - r e n t - s o u t h -
dakota-addresses-to-dodge-taxes-forever.html (reporting on wealthy families who have
created dynasty trusts in South Dakota).
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exempt perpetual trusts before the door closed on the opportunity. 
Treasury could have blunted the ineffectiveness of its proposal if
it had extended its proposal regarding new trusts to trusts in existence
before the effective date, i.e., to provide that the GST exemption
would expire ninety years after creation (or perhaps ninety years after
the date of enactment). A ninety-year limit on the GST exemption for
existing trusts would probably be constitutional.92
Had Treasury proposed a ninety-year limit on the GST exemption
for both new and existing trusts, the above commentary regarding its
proposal with respect to new trusts93 would apply (with one
exception) to existing trusts. The one exception is that trustees would
likely have to seek judicial or non-judicial modification of the trusts
to grant them power to avoid the GST tax by terminating the trust and
distributing the assets on or shortly before expiration of the ninety-
year limit,94 but the need to seek and exercise that power would not
arise until the trust neared its nine-decade mark and only then if the
GST tax and the ninety-year limit were still in effect.
The proposal that Treasury sent to Congress, however, only
applies a ninety-year limit on the GST exemption to new trusts, not
to new and existing trusts. Congress has, in any event, not acted on
Treasury’s modest proposal.
D. Proposed: An Effective Solution95
I offer a solution that would be far more effective than the
Treasury proposal. Congress should amend I.R.C. § 2631 (the section
creating the GST exemption) to provide that: 
(1) new trusts (i.e., those created on or after the effective date of enactment) do
not qualify for the GST exemption unless the terms of the trust or applicable
local law require the trust to terminate within the “perpetuities period”; and 
(2) existing trusts (i.e., those created before the effective date of enactment)
whose terms allow them to extend beyond the “perpetuities period” must be
modified during a specified grace period96 to require them to terminate within
92  See infra notes 104-105.
93  See supra text accompanying notes 85-91
94  See infra text accompanying notes 108-109.
95  Portions of subpart D draw on Lawrence W. Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST
Exemption for Perpetual Trusts, 135 TAX NOTES 1267 (Shelf Project June 4, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083804. 
96  The ALI’s Property Restatement Third provides that a donative document may be
modified, in a manner that does not violate the donor’s probable intention, to achieve the
donor’s tax objectives. See ALI’S PROPERTY RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, § 12.2
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the “perpetuities period” or lose their GST exemption at the end of the grace
period.
The “perpetuities period” should be defined—either in the statute
or, more likely and probably preferably, in regulations—to embrace
periods based in standard perpetuity law:97 (1) the traditional
common-law period (endorsed by USRAP) of a life in being plus
twenty-one years (usually effected by a common-law perpetuity-
saving clause included in the trust instrument98); (2) USRAP’s ninety-
year wait-and-see period; and (3) the ALI’s Property Restatement
Third’s two-younger-generations period, with special rules for cases
in which the share of a beneficiary is distributable on reaching the
specified age of thirty or younger and for trusts whose sole current
beneficiary is a named great-grandchild.99 
(2003). This provision of the ALI’s Property Restatement Third is codified in the Uniform
Trust Code and in the Uniform Probate Code. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416; UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-806. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003) (Power of Court to
Modify: Unanticipated Circumstances). Although these tax-modification sections
contemplate judicial action, they could be adapted to a private trust to grant the trustee
power to modify the terms of the trust without judicial approval. See also id. § 64 (2003)
(Termination or Modification by Trustee, Beneficiary, or Third Party).
97  For another purpose, a Treasury regulation already defines the “perpetuities period”
as either the life-in-being-plus-21-years period or the 90-years period. See Treas. Reg. §
26.2601-1(b)(1)(v)(B)(2). This regulation was issued before the ALI’s Property Restatement
Third adopted the “two-younger-generations” period.
98  See supra note 89.
99  See Waggoner, supra note 95, at 1270-71. It should be noted that the Joint
Committee on Taxation once proposed a two-generations limit on the GST exemption. See
STAFF REPORT, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE
AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 393 (JCS-02-05, Jan. 27, 2005) (no longer available
online; print copy on file with author). The Staff Report states: “Perpetual dynasty trusts are
inconsistent with the uniform structure of the estate and gift taxes to impose a transfer tax
once every generation. In addition, perpetual dynasty trusts deny equal treatment of all
taxpayers because such trusts can only be established in the States that have repealed the
mandatory rule against perpetuities.” The Staff Report then put forward the following
proposal: 
The proposal prohibits the allocation of the generation skipping tax
exemption to a “perpetual dynasty trust,” except to the extent that the trust
provides for distribution to beneficiaries in the generations of the transferor’s
children or grandchildren. Under the proposal, the generation-skipping tax
exemption effectively is limited to an exemption of a skip of one generation. A
“perpetual dynasty trust” is defined as a trust whose situs (place of creation) is a
State that either (1) has repealed the rule against perpetuities, (2) allows the
creator of a trust to elect to be exempt from the rule against perpetuities and the
creator so elects, or (3) has modified its rule against perpetuities to permit creation
of interests for individuals more than three generations younger than the interest’s
creator. If the situs of a trust is moved from a State that has retained the rule
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Although, in states in which applicable state law does not require
the trust to terminate within one of the three periods,100 the settlor
should be allowed to select one of the periods.101 Each of the three
periods has a basis in perpetuity law. Allowing trust settlors the
option of selecting, in the trust document, which of the three periods
(but not whichever period turns out to be the lengthiest of the three or
the lengthiest of two of the three) best suits the terms of the trust
would be consistent with the original purpose of the GST exemption.
All three perpetuity periods represent reasonable means of limiting
dead-hand control and are backed by the Uniform Law Commission
or the American Law Institute, the two premier deliberative bodies
devoted to impartial law reform based on the public interest.102 The
settlor should be allowed to select the period that best fits the needs
of the trust.103
One question remains: Would the second prong of the proposal,
the prong regarding existing trusts, be constitutional? For perpetual
trusts that were established before the effective date and therefore
have already qualified for the GST exemption, it might be
unconstitutional to deny the exemption retroactively104 or to terminate
against perpetuities to a State that has repealed the rule against perpetuities, its
inclusion ratio thereafter will be changed to one.
100  Realistically, state law would likely be enacted or amended fairly quickly to satisfy
the requirements. 
101  The settlor could not select the last of the three to expire (or second to last to
expire), but could select the earliest to expire of two or three of the alternative periods or
some period that expires earlier. 
102  The mission statement of each organization appears on their websites at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC and
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview.
103  The trust described in Illustration 1, supra Part V, would qualify for the GST
exemption. Assuming that the trusts in Illustrations 2 and 3 were modified as provided in the
ALI’s Property Restatement Third, those trusts would also qualify for the GST exemption. 
104  The constitutional question is whether retroactive tax legislation violates the due
process clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (‘‘Nor [shall any person]
be deprived of . . . property, without due process of law’’). (The constitutional prohibition
of ex post facto laws is irrelevant, because it applies only to criminal matters.) 
The controlling due process decision on retroactive tax legislation is United States v.
Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994). In Carlton, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
retroactive estate tax legislation to correct a congressional mistake. In the key passage, the
Court said: “The due process standard is met simply by showing that the retroactive
application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.” Id. at 30-31.
The Court also noted that Congress acted promptly after discovering the mistake and
therefore established only a modest period of retroactivity and that much immediate tax
revenue was going to be lost if the mistake was not corrected retroactively. Neither of those
features—prompt action nor immediate loss of substantial tax revenue—is present in the case
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the exemption on enactment.105 But it would almost certainly be
constitutional to grant a post-enactment grace period, say of six
months or perhaps a year,106 during which the terms of the trust could
be modified to require the trust to terminate within one of the three
perpetuity periods.107 
Although modification could be achieved judicially under existing
case law108 or under statutory law that is already enacted or, if
necessary, could be promptly enacted, it would be far more likely that
modification would be achieved non-judicially by the exercise of
trustee “decanting powers.”
Trust “decanting” allows the trustee—without judicial
oversight—to modify the terms of the original trust by creating a new
trust with different terms.109 Technically, any new trust created during
the grace period by the exercise of a “decanting power” might be
regarded as a post-effective-date trust, allowing aggressive estate
planners to argue that the new trust could remain GST-exempt for one
of the three perpetuity periods running from the decanting date.
Hopefully, the Treasury Department would see this ploy for the ruse
that it is, and issue regulations that provide that the GST-exempt
at hand, but it is unclear whether either one is a requirement. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
concurring in the result, did say, however, that in her view, “a period of retroactivity longer
than the year preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted would raise . .
. serious constitutional questions.” Id. at 38.
105  It might be constitutional to terminate the GST exemption upon enactment (id.), but
that approach seems to be harsh when a less intrusive approach—the grace period approach
advocated by the proposed solution—is more consistent with the original purpose of the
GST exemption, which was to allow trusts whose initial value does not exceed the
exemption ceiling to be exempt from GST tax for the time allowed by state perpetuity law.
106  See Waggoner, supra note 95, at 1271
107  See supra note 96. Requiring existing trusts to be modified to satisfy new tax
requirements is not unprecedented. See I.R.C. §§ 2055(e) and 2522(c).
108  To facilitate modification under state law, Congress should add a provision similar
to I.R.C. § 2055(e) or § 2522(c) for modification of split-interest charitable trusts. For state
law authority to modify trusts in the light of changes in tax law, see supra note 96. See also
Zeydel & Blattmachr, supra note 65. The ALI’s Property Restatement Third’s perpetuity rule
also calls for modification, providing: “Upon the petition of an interested person, the court
shall modify a disposition that [might extend beyond the perpetuity limit]. . . . The form of
the modification must be in a manner that most closely approximates the transferor’s
manifested plan of distribution and is within the perpetuity limit.” See ALI’S PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 36, § 27.2 (2011).
109  See supra note 60. A trustee “decanting power” is a fiduciary power of appointment.
If a perpetual trust is a discretionary trust, as most perpetual trusts are, the trustee has a
decanting power, which would enable the trustee to create a new trust with a termination
date within one of the three perpetuity periods. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST DECANTING ACT (now
in draft form), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Trust%20Decanting. 
37
Waggoner:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2014
38 Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why?
period runs from the creation date of the original trust. 
Any trust properly modified during the grace period would retain
its GST exemption.110 A trust not properly modified during the grace
period would lose its GST exemption on expiration of the grace
period.111 The GST tax would then apply to any post-grace-period
generation skipping transfer, whether it is a taxable termination, a
taxable distribution, or a direct skip.112
Because the solution proposed here would truly end the perpetual-
trust movement and its associated perpetual GST exemption for both
new and existing trusts, it is consistent with the original intent of
Congress in enacting the GST exemption.113
CONCLUSION
By enacting the GST exemption with no durational limit,
Congress unwittingly set in motion the perpetual-trust movement.
Although tax revenues are lost by Congress’s action and continued
inaction, Congress has failed—so far—to remedy its blunder. A
plausible explanation for its persistent indifference to the problem is
that the revenue that would be collected by reversing its action would
be a long way off.114
110  Once a trust qualifies for the exemption, it should be subject to disqualification by
any attempt to lengthen the term of the trust beyond the perpetuities period, through the use
of a “decanting power” or otherwise. See supra text accompanying note 109; cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 26.2601-1(b)(1)(v).
111  If a perpetual trust were not modified during the grace period, the GST exemption
could be restored by modifying the trust later, but the restoration would be effective only
upon modification.
112  These three types of generation-skipping transfers are defined supra note 26.
113  As expected, pro-perpetual-trust lawyers have come forward to argue that Congress
should not adopt my proposal, stating: “In our view, discouraging perpetual trusts is simply
not an appropriate use of federal tax law, regardless of the arguments one can legitimately
make about their evils. . . . The tax benefits of the GST exemption should not be used to try
to force taxpayers to create trusts with a federally mandated termination date or to modify
existing [perpetual] trusts to shorten their duration.” See Dennis I. Belcher, Carol A.
Harrington, Ellen K. Harrison, Amy E. Heller, Beth Shapiro Kaufman, Julie K. Kwon,
Carlyn S. McCaffrey, & Pam H. Schneider, Federal Tax Rules Should Not Be Used to Limit
Trust Duration, 136 TAX NOTES 832 (Aug. 13, 2012). For responses to their argument, see
Calvin H. Johnson, Perpetual Trusts: The Walking Dead, 136 TAX NOTES 1215 (Sept. 3,
2012), and Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Should Effectively Curb the GST Exemption
for Perpetual Trusts, 136 TAX NOTES 1216 (Sept. 3, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147989.
114   McCaffery offers a more cynical yet plausible explanation: “The rich setting up
dynasty trusts are willing to pay their advisers for the privilege of avoiding transfer taxes
forever. Those advisers and financial intermediaries, in turn, are willing to pay Congress to
keep the fear of a death tax—and hence their lucrative business model—alive (forever).
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Although the solution proposed here would not raise much
present or future GST tax revenue (nor would the Treasury
proposal115), raising present or future GST tax revenue was not the
purpose of the GST exemption. The purpose was to exempt trusts
whose initial value does not exceed the exemption ceiling from the
GST tax for the time allowed by state perpetuity law, but no longer.
On this score, the solution proposed here is more aligned with the
original purpose of the GST exemption than the Treasury proposal.
If Congress were to enact that proposal rather than the Treasury
proposal, existing and future trusts would terminate within the time
allowed by state perpetuity law. When the trusts terminate, the trust
principal would be distributed to the then-entitled beneficiaries, who
would then own their shares outright and free of trust. Transfer tax
revenue would thereafter arise from their future taxable transfers.
That’s exactly what Congress contemplated when it adopted the GST
exemption.
Regrettably, the prospect that Congress will ever address the
problem, much less address it effectively, grows dimmer with each
passing year and each missed opportunity.116
Congress is happy to cash the checks. . . . [I]t is easy to predict what will happen: not much.”
McCaffery, supra note 32, at 26. The Treasury proposal, supra Part VI.C, is arguably in the
“not much” category. See also MARK LEIBOVICH, THIS TOWN 161 (2013) (“Corporations
have figured out that despite the exorbitant costs of hiring lobbyists, the ability to shape or
tweak or kill even the tiniest legislative loophole can be worth tens of millions of dollars.”).
115  The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the revenue effects of the Treasury
proposal through 2023 to be “negligible.” JCT, Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue
Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Proposal, JCX-11-13, at
8 (May 10, 2013).
116   The Senate Finance Committee’s draft of the Tax Technical Corrections Act of
2 0 1 4  d o e s  n o t  a d d r e s s  t h e  i s s u e .  S e e
h t t p : / / w w w . f i n a n c e . s e n a t e . g o v / i m o / m e d i a / d o c / C h a i r m a n % 2 7 s % 2 0
Mark%20-%20Technical%20Corrections.pdf.
39
Waggoner:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2014
